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ABSTRACT: An argument developed by Michael Huemer raises doubts about the epistemic 
responsibility of taking a ‘critical thinking’ approach to belief formation. This paper takes issue with 
Huemer’s depiction of critical thinking as an approach that rejects all reliance on the intellectual 
authority of others, and it offers a more realistic depiction. The paper ultimately contends that 
Huemer’s argument fails because it rests on an impoverished and unaccountably individualistic 
notion of epistemic responsibility. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The justifications that are given for critical thinking, whether in education or daily 
life, too often rest on familiar refrains that resemble articles of faith more than 
principled argument. For this reason, reasoned skepticism about the value of critical 
thinking should be welcomed. Skeptical challenges force advocates of critical 
thinking to improve their accounts of why critical thinking is valuable and to seek 
out better theoretical foundations for critical thinking. 
In this paper, I examine Michael Huemer’s skeptical argument regarding the 
value of critical thinking, which he presents in “Is Critical Thinking Epistemically 
Responsible?”. In that paper, Huemer questions the value of critical thinking as an 
approach to what he calls “controversial, publicly discussed issues.” (Huemer, 2005, 
p. 524) What he has in mind are issues such as the gun control, the ethics of 
abortion, and creationism vs. evolution. Huemer makes the bold claim that, for the 
nonexpert, critical thinking is an inferior approach to forming beliefs regarding 
these issues. The implication that can be drawn from the title of the paper1 is that it 
is at least doubtful that critical thinking is an epistemically responsible approach for 
these issues. In the end, I contend that Huemer’s argument is defeatable, and I argue 
that the best way to overcome his argument involves stepping away from an 
                                                        
1 Huemer never explicitly draws the connection to epistemic responsibility. The closest he comes is 
when he identifies the issue of his paper as being that of “the epistemic rationality of critical 
thinking.” p. 528. The title of his paper suggests that Huemer equates epistemic responsibility and 
epistemic rationality. I don’t equate the two; I limit the discussion in this paper to epistemic 
responsibility, which I take to be more appropriate to the question of the value of critical thinking. 
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individualistic approach to epistemology and grounding critical thinking, at least 
partly, in social epistemology and virtue epistemology.  
 
2. RELIABILITY AND EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY 
 
2.1 Huemer’s reliability argument 
 
Huemer takes aim at critical thinking as an approach for reaching true beliefs (and 
avoiding false beliefs) regarding certain contentious issues. To do this he sets out a 
strategy for belief formation that he characterizes as a minimal requirement of 
critical thinking. We’ll refer to this approach as CT:2  
 
You gather the arguments and evidence that are available on the issue, from all 
sides, and assess them for yourself. You try thereby to form some overall impression 
on the issue. If you form such an impression, you base your belief on that. 
Otherwise, you suspend judgment. (Huemer, 2005, p. 523) 
 
Huemer adds an important clarification regarding CT: it excludes any 
reliance on the intellectual authority of others. The assessment of evidence under 
CT does not include assessing the reliability of an expert and using that reliability 
assessment as a basis for accepting an opinion from that expert. And Huemer holds 
that this feature of CT is also a feature of critical thinking more broadly.  
 
I assume only that critical thinking requires at least this much: that one attempt to 
assess arguments and evidence on their merits, as opposed to relying on the 
intellectual authority of others….[C]ritical thinkers look only to the reasons the 
expert has for giving that answer. If they find those reasons wanting, then the 
expert’s opinion will carry no weight with them. And even if they find the reasons 
cogent, the fact that the reasons were endorsed by the expert will give no additional 
force to the conclusion they support. (Huemer, 2005, p. 523) 
 
We should think of CT strictly as an approach to belief formation and strip 
away any other roles for critical thinking. In competition with CT, Huemer asks us to 
recognize two other strategies for reaching our beliefs: 
 
Credulity: You canvas the opinions of a number of experts and adopt the belief held 
by most of them. In the best case, you find a poll of the experts; failing that, you may 
look through several books and articles and identify their overall conclusions. 
 
Skepticism: You form no opinion, that is, you withhold judgment about the issue. 
(Huemer, 2005, pp. 522-523) 
 
Huemer takes it as the received view that CT “is the best of the three 
strategies, and certainly better than Credulity,” but he argues that, at least with 
                                                        
2 Huemer refers to this minimal notion by using only the uppercase ‘Critical Thinking.’ I use ‘CT’ to 
avoid confusing this minimal notion with ‘critical thinking’ in the full sense. 
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respect to controversial issues, CT is never the best strategy. (Huemer, 2005, pp. 
523-524)  
The first argument that Huemer presents to show the shortcomings of CT 
concerns its reliability. He asks us to consider controversial issues about which 
there is a consensus among the experts in the field. These would presumably be 
issues about which there is significant and fundamental disagreement, but it is 
limited to nonexperts. Huemer suggests that the issue of evolution vs. creationism is 
one example. (I’m hard-pressed to think of many others.) Huemer argues that 
Credulity is the superior strategy in cases like these and that CT is the inferior 
strategy because it never does better than Credulity.  
If the nonexpert adopts CT as a strategy in this instance, one of three things 
can happen. The nonexpert could eventually agree with the experts. This might be a 
nice result for CT, but as far as reaching truth and avoiding error is concerned, the 
Credulity strategy would work just as well. The second possibility for the nonexpert 
who utilizes CT is that she disagrees with the consensus of experts. Given the 
experts’ intelligence and their vast advantage in knowledge, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that the community of experts is far more likely to be right than the 
nonexpert is, so Credulity clearly beats CT here. The third possibility is that the CT-
utilizing nonexpert suspends judgment. The CT-utilizer suffers an opportunity cost 
here. She forms no belief on an issue about which it is probably worthwhile to have 
a belief. Moreover, one of the available beliefs has a community of experts to vouch 
for it. 
Next Huemer asks us to consider controversial issues about which there is no 
consensus among experts. There are undoubtedly many other vexed issues that 
would fit this description. In cases like these, Huemer argues that Skepticism is the 
superior strategy. Again he asks us to consider the possibilities. The nonexpert who 
adopts the CT strategy could reach a condition of suspended judgment, in which 
case CT offers no advantage over Skepticism, which prescribed suspended judgment 
from the outset. Or the nonexpert could follow CT and arrive at a determinate belief 
on the issue. In this case, Huemer asks us to consider whether such a belief should 
be trusted. With all the time and resources that the experts devoted to this issue, 
they have been unable to achieve a consensus. So it doesn’t seem likely that any 
particular expert would be a reliable source regarding what is true, or right, with 
respect to this issue. So why should our nonexpert prove to be reliable on this issue? 
So Huemer is arguing that either Credulity or Skepticism will come out on top 
every time. Whether you choose Credulity over Skepticism or Skepticism over 
Credulity depends on your aversion to error. If you have a strong aversion to error, 
you should follow Skepticism for any instance in which there is not a strong 
consensus among experts. If you have less aversion to error, you might follow 
Credulity in instances where a healthy majority of experts come down on one side 
rather than the other. But no matter what your aversion to error, CT is always 
inferior in its reliability. 
 
2.2 Epistemic self-reliance and critical thinking 
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Before we evaluate Huemer’s reliability argument, we should take a moment to 
appreciate the full extent of the epistemic self-reliance in CT. If CT is a minimal 
requirement of critical thinking, then reliance on the authority of experts is 
prohibited for the critical thinker. As the earlier quotation from Huemer makes 
clear, the critical thinker looks only to the reasons that the expert gives and not to 
the fact that the reasons have been given by an expert. According to Huemer’s 
depiction of CT, “the fact that the reasons were endorsed by the expert will give no 
additional force to the conclusion they support.” (Huemer, 2005, p. 523)  
The view that CT is a minimal requirement of critical thinking would 
obviously be untenable if it were a claim about critical thinking with broad 
application, or about what we might call ‘the critical thinking tradition.’ Careful 
definitions of critical thinking (e.g., Fisher and Scriven, 1997, p. 21) make no 
mention of the sort of epistemic self-reliance that we find in CT. Moreover, many 
critical thinking textbooks (e.g., Fisher, 2011, pp. 83-113) actually present the 
evaluation of testimony and expert authority as important elements of critical 
thinking, presupposing that the endorsement of an opinion by an expert can be 
epistemically relevant. And the fact that appeal to authority in arguments is 
considered to be a part-time fallacy at best (see Coleman, 1995) suggests that within 
mainstream views of critical thinking, reliance on expert opinion is sometimes 
deemed acceptable. 
I attribute to Huemer the far more defensible view that the epistemic self-
reliance we find in CT is a minimal requirement of critical thinking about the 
“controversial, publicly discussed issues” that his paper is concerned with. This view 
has far more intuitive appeal, especially if we are talking about ethical and public 
policy issues. For ethical and public policy issues at least3, I think that Huemer is on 
to something when he points to epistemic self-reliance as a requirement for critical 
thinking. Some degree of epistemic self-reliance is implicit in the notion of critical 
thinking, and I think we’d all agree that someone who relied entirely, or even 
mostly, on the authority of experts in reaching a belief about a controversial public 
policy issue would not be engaging in critical thinking. The question is what degree 
of epistemic self-reliance is a requirement for critical thinking. Is it the complete 
epistemic self-reliance of CT, or is it a limited epistemic self-reliance? 
To justify his view that the epistemic self-reliance of CT is generally 
considered to be a minimal requirement of critical thinking, Huemer produces three 
quotations from prominent introductory textbooks that focus on reasoning about 
philosophical and ethical issues. Each seems to support the view that the extreme 
epistemic self-reliance of CT is essential to critical thinking. In each quotation, 
readers (i.e., students) are advised to “think difficult issues through for themselves.” 
This quote from Louis Pojman is representative: “In this conversation, all sides of an 
issue should receive a fair hearing, and then you, the reader, should make up your 
own mind on the issue.” (Pojman, 1991, p. 5).  
                                                        
3 I would not grant this regarding the one scientific issue that Huemer includes among his 
“controversial, publicly discussed issues,” that of creationism vs. evolution. This could raise further 
doubts about Huemer’s argument, but they won’t be raised in this paper. 
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But this argument should not convince us that the epistemic self-reliance 
within CT is a requirement for critical thinking about these issues. Given the context 
in which the quotations were written, it is far from clear that the authors were 
endorsing the view that experts’ opinions on these issues should never carry weight. 
The quoted statements are addressed to students who are embarking on an ethics 
or philosophy course. While we can be sure the authors intend their advice to 
extend to the reading of the textbook and to activities in the corresponding course, 
we cannot conclude that the authors intend the advice to extend beyond the scope 
of the course to daily life. It seems more likely that the advice is intended largely as a 
short-term corrective to a group of (mostly young) people who might be overly 
reliant on authority in their thinking about ethical issues.  
The question of what degree of epistemic self-reliance is appropriate to 
critical thinking needs to be addressed more carefully. And we need to be aware that 
there are options that stop well short of the complete epistemic self-reliance of CT.  
Consider an example. Let’s say that you are a nonexpert who reads and 
considers an argument—call it Argument X—on whether some form of assisted 
suicide should be legal, and you find it very persuasive. You’ve applied your critical 
thinking skills in evaluating Argument X and any contending argument you can find, 
and Argument X comes through with top marks. A short time later you learn that 
Argument X was written and developed by a world-renowned ethicist. Huemer 
would say that for the critical thinker, the information about the argument’s origins 
should add nothing to your level of confidence in Argument X and its conclusion. 
Conversely, if you learn that Argument X was written by an anonymous blogger, this 
should take away nothing from your level of confidence. 
But surely this goes too far. Most of us would be inclined to be more 
confident in Argument X when we learn that it originated with a well-regarded 
expert, and there is a sound basis for this inclination. You are a nonexpert (by 
hypothesis) and you are considering an argument about a subject matter in which 
the well-regarded expert has undoubtedly done considerable research over the 
years. Some humility on your part is surely appropriate. Once you take into account 
the likelihood that there are limitations in your understanding of the issue, you are 
quite right to be reassured when you learn that Argument X originated with a well-
regarded expert. And by the same token should lose some confidence in Argument X 
if you learn it originates with an anonymous blogger. It’s far more likely that there 
are gaps in the anonymous blogger’s understanding of the issue than in the well-
regarded expert’s. As a nonexpert on the subject, you are not in a good position to 
identify those gaps. So even if you are approaching the issues from a critical-
thinking frame of mind, learning that Argument X originated with a well-regarded 
expert is a legitimate basis for greater confidence in its conclusion. 
To be clear, I’m not arguing that a critical thinking approach dictates that you 
have to be more confident in the conclusion when you learn that Argument X comes 
from an expert source, but in a situation like this it is surely epistemically 
permissible—and consistent with a critical thinking approach—to be more 
confident in a conclusion when you learn that it is championed by an expert on the 
issue.  
DAVID KARY 
6 
Contra Huemer, critical thinking, even about the limited set of controversial, 
publicly discussed issues, is compatible with some reliance on the intellectual 
authority of others. But this is not to say that a critical thinking approach is 
compatible with reliance on just anyone’s intellectual authority. Critical thinking 
still requires some degree of epistemic self-reliance. One sensible restriction on the 
reliance on epistemic authority, and one that falls squarely within the critical 
thinking tradition, is something like the following: One may rely on the intellectual 
authority of others only if that authority is reasonably established. Details of what it 
might mean for intellectual authority to be reasonably established can be found 
elsewhere in the literature of informal logic and social epistemology. (e.g., Goldman, 
2011) 
 So to give critical thinking a fair hearing within Huemer’s argument, we’ll 
have to revise CT to give it a less stringent requirement of epistemic self-reliance. 
Doing this makes Huemer’s reliability argument somewhat more difficult to 
evaluate, but I don’t think it undermines the argument. Assessing arguments and 
evidence for yourself is still at the heart of a revised version of CT. The restricted 
reliance on expert authority that I’ve argued to be compatible with critical thinking 
comes into play only after the arguments and evidence have been assessed. This 
reliance on expert authority might change your level of confidence in your opinion, 
or it might even change your opinion in borderline cases in which your level of 
confidence was quite low to begin with, but it doesn’t play a part in the initial 
formation of your opinion. So Huemer’s reliability argument is not blocked at this 
point. 
 
2.3 The limitations of Credulity and Skepticism 
 
Having a reliable means of identifying experts is crucial to Huemer’s reliability 
argument. To rely on the combination of Credulity and Skepticism that he puts 
forward as the preferred alternative to CT, you first need to identify the full range of 
relevant experts so that you can assess how much divergence of opinion there is 
among them. And the identification of experts comes into play again in the Credulity 
strategy, which has you canvass the opinions of experts and adopt the belief held by 
most of them.  
 Relying only on expert opinion in the identification of experts would lead to a 
regress of sorts, so Huemer grants that some element of critical thinking is 
necessary for the identification of trustworthy experts. He does that by offering the 
following clarification on his thesis: 
 
I contend only for the more modest thesis that, with respect to publicly discussed 
issues, one should usually not rely on one’s own judgment and reasoning directly 
about the publicly discussed issue itself. This is compatible with the point that one 
should rely on one’s own judgment and reasoning in determining which experts to 
rely on with regard to the publicly discussed issue. (Huemer, 2005, p. 529) 
 
Huemer argues that there is no inconsistency involved in doubting the reliability of 
critical thinking with regard to forming beliefs and at the same time contending that 
DAVID KARY 
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critical thinking is reliable enough for determining which experts to rely on. He 
reasons that it is much easier to determine whether a particular individual is an 
expert on an issue than it is to develop a sound opinion on that issue. The question 
of who is an expert does not require expertise in the same way that knowledge of 
the issue itself does. (Huemer, 2005, p. 530) Huemer goes on to suggest that 
followers of the Credulity and Skepticism strategies would identify experts in a way 
similar to that in which courts and legislatures identify expert witnesses, 
presumably by looking at things like credentials, publications, and peer-opinion.  
 We might grant that one can identify experts about controversial, publicly 
discussed issues in this manner, but for most of these issues it seems doubtful that 
we should base our beliefs on expert opinion. This is because of a fundamental 
difference between expertise regarding ethical and public policy issues and 
expertise on scientific and technical issues—the kinds of expertise that courts and 
legislatures generally tap when they call expert witnesses. In the case of experts on 
ethical or public policy issues, expertise rests on knowledge of the literature, the fact 
that peers judge one’s reasoning and other research to conform to certain 
standards, and, perhaps, originality. But there is no apparent connection between 
this sort of expertise and the truth of the expert’s opinion on the fundamental issue. 
 Compare this to the sort of expert who might be called to testify in court. 
Consider an engineer who is called to testify regarding whether the design and 
construction of a certain bridge conforms to professional and industry standards. 
Like an expert an issue in ethics or public policy, this expert has the right credentials 
and a demonstrated knowledge of the relevant domain, but this expert is testifying 
on the sort of issue that people know how to resolve, at least in principle. It’s a 
matter of investigating the design and construction of the bridge and comparing 
what you learn to an antecedently agreed-upon set of professional and industry 
standards.  
 In a discussion of expertise, Alvin Goldman draws a distinction between 
primary and secondary questions in a domain. In Goldman’s words:  
 
Primary questions are the principal questions of interest to researchers or students 
of a subject matter. Secondary questions concern the existing evidence or 
arguments that bear on the primary questions, and the assessments of the evidence 
made by prominent researchers. (Goldman, 2011, p. 115) 
 
Using this distinction, Goldman identifies two senses of “expert.” An expert in the 
strong sense has “an unusually extensive body of knowledge on both primary and 
secondary questions in the domain.” An expert in the weak sense “merely has 
extensive knowledge on the secondary questions in the domain.”  
 Adopting Goldman’s terminology, it seems that experts on ethical or public 
policy issues can never be anything more than experts in weak sense. Consider an 
expert on the ethics of euthanasia. This expert knows all the important arguments 
and knows where all the other important figures in the literature stand and why. 
But we would not attribute to them knowledge of the primary questions of this 
issue—those of the conditions (if any) under which euthanasia is ethically 
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permissible. For this controversial ethical issue, and any other we can think of, 
knowledge of the primary questions is in dispute.  
 For many of the issues that Huemer has in mind then, there’s no reason that 
the Credulity strategy will tend to lead us to the truth. To canvas the experts whose 
knowledge extends only to Goldman’s secondary questions—those with an 
extensive knowledge of the debate but no advantage in answering the principle 
questions of interest—does not lead us any closer to the truth. This accords with our 
everyday practice and intuitions—most of us would never think of basing an ethical 
belief on the opinion of a body of experts without first undertaking an evaluation of 
those experts’ arguments.  
 In fairness to Huemer’s argument, it can be argued that his preferred 
combination of the Credulity and Skepticism strategies is doing everything it is 
supposed to do. It can be argued that there’s nothing wrong with the Credulity 
strategy, it’s just been misapplied to issues for which the Skepticism strategy is 
appropriate. Yes, there are ethical and public policy issues for which there is little 
connection between expert opinion and the truth of the matter, but these are the 
same issues on which you would not find anything approximating a consensus 
among experts. These are cases in which the Skepticism strategy should be used.  
 But if this is the case, it seems that Huemer’s preferred combination of 
Credulity and Skepticism strategies would recommend Skepticism for virtually all 
ethical and public policy issues that are controversial. (If an ethical or public policy 
issue is at all controversial, is it likely to be the sort of issue that can be settled by a 
poll of expert opinion?) This leads us to reconsider the Skepticism strategy. We need 
to entertain serious doubts about its feasibility, especially if there are so many 
controversial, publicly discussed issues on which Skepticism is called for.  
In a nutshell, the problem with the Skepticism strategy is that life has a way 
of impelling us to have opinions. Withholding judgment is often not a viable option. 
Adult members of democratic societies are called on to vote every few years and the 
question of who to vote for often rests in part on the candidate’s stances on ethical 
and public policy issues. If we wish to exercise our votes responsibly, we’ll need to 
have reasonable opinions on at least some of these issues. Inevitably this will 
include issues about which there is no consensus among the experts. This leaves the 
follower of the Skepticism strategy with no recourse. And another time that life 
forces us to have opinions is when we face difficult ethical decisions. Again it seems 
likely that many of these decisions require opinions on issues about which there is 
no consensus among experts. Again the Skepticism-follower has no recourse. 
 Huemer might say that these examples of choices that are forced (in some 
sense) are irrelevant because they don’t bear on the truth-conduciveness of the 
Skepticism strategy. But if there are too many of these forced choices, the 
Skepticism strategy simply becomes infeasible and the question of truth-
conduciveness becomes moot. 
 But suppose that we put these doubts about the feasibility of Credulity and 
Skepticism aside for the moment, and assume that those strategies are the best, 
most truth-conducive approaches to the controversial issues that we have in mind. 
We’ll take for granted that the best means of gaining true beliefs and avoiding false 
beliefs when there is a consensus or near-consensus among experts is to adopt the 
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majority opinion among those experts. Or if there is nothing approximating a 
consensus among experts, our best approach is to simply withhold judgment. Now 
let’s consider the fate of someone who adopts this strategy for investigating 
controversial, publicly discussed issues. In what position would this person be left 
after several years?  
This situation is hard to imagine, but it seems to me that this person would 
have a body of beliefs that she could not defend with any principles or arguments 
other than those which justify the Credulity and Skepticism strategies. So if she’s 
asked why she’s in favor of certain forms of gun control, she might respond that 
most policy experts are in favor of those gun control measures. If she’s asked why 
she has no opinion about whether certain forms of euthanasia are ethically 
permissible, she might simply respond that there’s a wide diversity of opinion 
among experts on this issue. She’s had no other reasons than these when she formed 
her beliefs, so any other reasons she could provide would evidently have to be made 
up on the spot, drawing on a scant base of whatever principles and arguments she 
can recall from the days when she assessed arguments for herself. 
There’s a problem here. Her system of beliefs wouldn’t be doing everything 
we expect it to do. Of course, she could take extra measures to study the various 
arguments and principles associated with the positions she’s adopted, merely for 
the sake of defending those positions. But if she’s committed to Credulity and 
Skepticism as the best belief-formation strategies for issues like these, it seems 
pointless to offer any arguments other than appeals to authority. Doing so would 
merely encourage other nonexperts to persist in their discredited critical-thinking-
based approaches. 
 I mention the fate of those who would implement the Credulity and 
Skepticism strategies both to raise further doubts about their feasibility for human 
beings and to suggest that there is much more at stake here than truth-
conduciveness. The next section takes up the issue of whether, by centering his 
argument on truth-conduciveness, Huemer misses the mark regarding the epistemic 
responsibility of critical thinking. 
  
2.4 Epistemic responsibility 
 
Let’s put aside any objections about the feasibility of following the Credulity and 
Skepticism strategies and assume that Huemer’s argument succeeds in seeding 
doubts about critical thinking as a guide to an individual’s gaining true beliefs and 
avoiding false beliefs. How would this bear on the question that Huemer asks in the 
title of his paper: Is critical thinking epistemically responsible?  
 I contend that Huemer’s argument fails to properly address this question, 
because the most that his argument could achieve is to demonstrate that critical 
thinking is not as truth conducive as the combination of Credulity and Skepticism 
that he favors. To take the further step to the question of epistemic responsibility, 
Huemer has to hold that if one’s investigational approach is not the best available 
approach for gaining true beliefs and avoiding false ones, then one is not being 
epistemically responsible in using that approach. I don’t think this inference holds 
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up, and the primary reason is that epistemic responsibility has a strong social 
dimension that makes it distinct from mere truth conduciveness. 
The social dimension of epistemic responsibility can be thought of in terms of 
intellectual virtues; it includes any intellectual virtues that contribute to truth or 
rationality in the beliefs of others. These same intellectual virtues might also 
contribute to truth or rationality in your own beliefs, but part of the reason they are 
considered intellectual virtues is their contribution to the beliefs of others. The view 
that epistemic responsibility has a social dimension is alive in the literature on 
epistemic responsibility from its beginnings. For Lorraine Code, epistemic 
responsibility, like other intellectual virtues, should be understood as benefitting 
more than just the possessor but the community as well. (Code, 1987, p. 60) It is 
clear that in Code’s view, epistemic responsibility is as much a responsibility to 
others as it is a responsibility to one’s self. And in the wider literature on virtue 
epistemology, traits such as originality and intellectual courage are considered 
intellectual virtues despite the fact that they might very well not be truth conducive 
for the individuals that possess them (though they are conducive to the 
advancement of human knowledge). (Zagzebski, 1996, p. 462 and p. 465) 
 The reason that Huemer’s argument does not impugn the epistemic 
responsibility of critical thinking is that critical thinking does a far better job of 
satisfying the social dimension of epistemic responsibility than Huemer’s Credulity 
and Skepticism strategies do. For one thing, forming beliefs through critical thinking 
enhances your ability to give good reasons for your beliefs. This ability is an 
intellectual virtue that contributes to improvement in the beliefs of others by 
challenging their beliefs, by giving them new reasons for their beliefs, or merely 
engaging them in productive discussion. The Credulity and Skepticism strategies, on 
the other hand, contribute little or nothing to the cultivation of intellectual virtues 
like this one. If these strategies are truth conducive, they are conducive to truth only 
for the individuals who follow these strategies. They do not contribute to on-going 
debates; they do not lead to improvements in the beliefs and the thinking of others.  
 Intellectual courage is another intellectual virtue that is part of the social 
dimension of epistemic responsibility. Having the fortitude to hold on to unpopular 
beliefs and ideas in the face of challenge can, to some degree, be of benefit to your 
own beliefs, but the prime beneficiary of one person’s intellectual courage is the 
surrounding group or community. (Montmarquet, 1993, p. 28) People with 
intellectual courage challenge received wisdom in groups, standing in the way of the 
pernicious phenomenon known as “groupthink.” (Janis, 1971) Such people also keep 
alive unpopular views that might gain wider acceptance in the future. In either case, 
intellectual courage is of benefit to the beliefs of others. 
 Because it has a social dimension, epistemic responsibility requires more 
than just practices conducive to gaining true beliefs and avoiding false ones. 
Epistemic responsibility calls for making the right sort of contributions to group 
efforts, including contributions to productive debates on the issues. Huemer’s 
Credulity and Skepticism strategies, as I’ve argued in section 2.3, would lead 
adherents to engage in truly bizarre belief-behavior that flies in the face of epistemic 
responsibility. 
DAVID KARY 
11 
 One cannot salvage Huemer’s argument by conceding that it fails to raise 
doubts about the epistemic responsibility of critical thinking while contending that 
it raises important doubts on a lesser charge, such as being insufficiently reliable or 
truth conducive. These lesser charges do not bear on the value of critical thinking in 
the way that epistemic responsibility does. Truth conduciveness is just part of the 
picture; the concept of epistemic responsibility puts together a full picture of what’s 
at stake when we form our beliefs.  
 
3. CRITICAL THINKING AND CONSISTENCY 
 
Huemer gives a second argument against critical thinking as an approach to forming 
beliefs. This one charges the underlying “theory” of critical thinking with 
inconsistency. Huemer believes that there is a problem with critical thinking in that 
it has us privilege our own inferences and our own reliability over the inferences 
and reliability of others who have a similar commitment to critical thinking and who 
are similar to us in terms of knowledge and critical thinking ability.  
Imagine that you are talking to someone (let’s call him Frank) whom you 
know to be a nonexpert on a particular issue, to have no cognitive advantages over 
you, and to be a dedicated to the practice of critical thinking. Likewise, you have no 
expertise on that issue. Frank tells you that he has applied his critical thinking skills 
to the issue and on that basis he assures you of the truth of one of the competing 
positions. Does Frank’s sincere effort and testimony give you a sufficient basis for 
reasonable belief? 
Almost anyone would say no, deeming that Frank is not a reliable source on 
this issue. This leads Huemer to ask this question: If the techniques involved in 
critical thinking are not reliable in the hands of an average nonexpert, then why 
should anyone be advised to rely on those techniques? Moreover, why should we 
ourselves rely on our critical thinking abilities in forming beliefs regarding issues on 
which we lack expertise? (p. 526) 
For Huemer, the problem with a critical-thinking-based strategy is that  
 
…it posits an agent-centered epistemic norm: it holds that, if a person applies 
certain techniques in arriving at a conclusion, then she has good reason to accept 
that conclusion, but others who know that she arrived at the conclusion by those 
techniques do not thereby have good reason to accept it. It is unclear why this 
should be so. (p. 526) 
 
Huemer is right that anyone who advocates critical thinking as a basis for 
belief formation is advocating an agent-centered epistemic norm. And there is a sort 
of inconsistency involved in privileging your own conclusions over the conclusions 
drawn by others. But this doesn’t have to be a problem. Huemer provides no 
reasons why we should be concerned about this sort of inconsistency, and in the 
absence of any good argument to the contrary, this inconsistency seems appropriate 
rather pernicious. The agent-centered epistemic norm that underlies the use of 
one’s own critical thinking in belief formation actually accords well with epistemic 
responsibility. When one is involved in an on-going discussion or debate about a 
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controversial ethical or public-policy issue, it is epistemically responsible to 
privilege one’s own beliefs. To renounce one’s own beliefs at every credible 
challenge blocks possibilities for meaningful debate and other exchanges of ideas. 
The intellectual courage to stick to one’s beliefs is an important component of 
epistemic responsibility. 
I should add that the agent-centered epistemic norm behind critical thinking 
is not as extreme as Huemer makes it out to be. I’ve argued in section 2.2 that 
critical thinking is compatible with taking into account the opinions of experts. And 
a more general case can be made to the effect that critical thinking is compatible 
with taking into account the opinions of others in privileged epistemic positions, 
including the opinions of nonexpert witnesses.  
 
4. CONCLUSION  
 
I’ve argued that Huemer’s skeptical argument fails in two respects. The first is that 
the alternatives to critical thinking that are considered in his argument are not 
feasible. There is some doubt about whether human beings could follow those 
alternative strategies, and if they could follow those strategies it would leave them 
cognitively hobbled. The second is that Huemer’s argument measures the value of 
critical thinking entirely in terms of its truth conduciveness with respect the beliefs 
of the individuals who might adopt the critical thinking approach. At the same time, 
his argument is ostensibly about epistemic responsibility. I’ve argued that while 
epistemic responsibility is the right yardstick by which to judge the value of critical 
thinking, Huemer’s argument never really touches on epistemic responsibility 
because it never considers its social dimension. Moreover, the investigative 
approaches that Huemer purports to be superior to any critical-thinking-based 
approach would fail utterly in satisfying this social dimension.  
These two objections to Huemer’s argument converge in that they involve 
looking beyond the truth conduciveness of critical thinking and even beyond the 
benefits that critical thinking offers for the critical thinker’s own system of beliefs. 
This is instructive; it suggests that to give a good account of the foundations of 
critical thinking, we need to develop a more complete picture of what critical 
thinking is good for. This includes looking at the value of critical thinking to 
groups—communities, professional bodies, corporations, and entire societies. 
Virtue epistemology and social epistemology can provide insight in this regard.  
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